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F,	it	is	insufficient	to	have	𝛽(𝐴),	𝛽 𝐵 … 𝛽(𝐹).	For	a	consistent	joint	probability	distribution	across	161	
any	combination	of	question	outcomes,	she	also	needs	to	construct	a	bigger	Boolean	algebra	162	


























































other,	so	that	e.g.	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝐴 𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴)	or	conditionally	independent	so	that	e.g.	213	
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝐴&𝐵 𝑋 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴|𝑋) ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐵|𝑋).	Clearly,	such	an	approach	has	simplifying	potential,	since	214	
a	complex	conditional	probability	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝐴 𝑋!,𝑋!,𝑋!,𝑋!… 	might	be	easily	computable	as	e.g.		215	




























𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑋1!"# 𝑋2!"#,𝑋3!"#,𝑌1!"#,𝑌2!"#,𝑌3!"#,𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡!"# ∙242	
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑋2!"# 𝑋3!"#,𝑌1!"#,𝑌2!"#,𝑌3!"#,𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡!"# …𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡!"#).	The	Markov	property	243	
allows	us	to	assume	certain	questions	to	be	independent.	For	example,	regarding	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝐴 𝑋,𝑌)	we	244	




𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑋1!"# 𝐴!"#,𝐵!"# ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑋2!"# 𝐶!"#,𝐷!"# …,	where	A,	B	are	two	questions	on	which	X1	249	
depends	etc.	As	long	as	m<<n,	each	term	requires	𝑘!	probabilities	(ignoring	‘-1’),	for	a	total	of	250	
approximately	𝑛 ∙ 𝑘!	probabilities	[55].	The	associated	coding	complexity	for	the	joint	probability	251	
distribution	given	a	particular	Bayesian	Network	is	𝑛 ∙ 𝑘! log! 𝑛 ∙ 𝑘! 	bits.	We	also	need	the	252	
information	cost	of	specifying	a	Bayesian	Network,	and	can	show	that	overall	the	information	cost	253	
for	probabilistic	information	encoded	using	a	Bayesian	Network	is	 𝑛 ∙ 𝑘! log! 𝑛 ∙ 𝑘! +254	
𝑛 log!
𝑛 − 1






















































































































































































































































































































































































































= 𝐾! ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏!(𝑡),	where	𝐾!,	the	intensity	matrix	for	
question	A,	is	a	transition	matrix	which	determines	which	elements	of	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏! 𝑥, 𝑡 	grow	more	or	less	
probable.	For	a	collection	of	questions,	we	write	!"#$% !,!
!"















































−𝑖𝐻𝜓 𝑡 ,	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝐴;𝜓 𝑡 = 𝑃!𝜓 𝑡 !	and	for	another	question	B	(which	may	not	even	be	known	in	
advance),	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝐵;𝜓 𝑡 = 𝑃!𝜓 𝑡 !,	where	𝑃!,	𝑃!	can	be	related	by	a	unitary	transformation.	
Outcome	combinations	for	incompatible	questions	also	do	not	evolve	separately,	e.g.,	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝐴 ∧
















































































































































































































































































sense	of	uncertainty	is	often	quantified	using	entropy,	𝑆 = − 𝑝! log 𝑝!! ,	where	the	summation	
ranges	across	all	outcomes	to	a	question.	Entropy	is	higher	when	more	options	are	equiprobable	and	
the	more	certain	we	are	regarding	the	resolution	of	a	question,	the	lower	the	entropy;	e.g.,	if	
regarding	a	binary	question	we	have	Prob(Yes)=0.9,	entropy	will	be	lower	compared	to	if	
Prob(Yes)=0.6.	Consider	quantum	Alice	contemplating	the	Brexit	issue,	which	consists	of	several	
specific	questions.	The	entropy	function	is	additive	and	so	Alice’s	total	entropy	will	be	the	sum	of	
individual	question	entropies.	Suppose	Alice	simplifies	her	Brexit	Boolean	algebra,	so	that	she	
considers	only	2-3	questions	in	her	preferred	basis	set.	Given	the	small	number	of	questions,	she	can	
plausibly	devote	sufficient	effort	to	each	question	and	move	from	a	state	of	higher	uncertainty	to	
one	of	lower	uncertainty	(e.g.,	with	binary	questions,	suppose	that	initially	Prob(Q1,	yes)=0.6,	
Prob(Q2,	yes)=0.4,	Prob(Q3,	yes)=0.5,	but	after	some	thought	Prob(Q1,	yes)=0,8,	Prob(Q2,	yes)=0.1,	
and	Prob(Q3,	yes)=0.9).		
Suppose	Bob	employs	a	more	faithful	Boolean	algebra,	consisting	of	20	questions.	Bob	will	
have	a	more	accurate,	nuanced	picture	for	Brexit.	However,	if	we	assume	that	Alice	and	Bob	have	
the	same	amount	of	time	for	their	deliberation,	then	Bob	will	be	able	to	devote	less	time	per	
question	than	Alice,	and	so	the	reduction	in	uncertainty	for	Bob’s	(already	more	numerous)	
questions	will	be	lower	than	that	for	Alice.	After	deliberation,	on	average,	Alice	is	likely	to	end	up	
with	questions	of	lower	entropy	than	Bob	(Figure	SM2).	Additionally,	the	maximum	possible	entropy	
increases	with	the	dimensionality	N	as	𝑁 log𝑁.	So,	if	information	overflow	encourages	Alice	to	
squeeze	a	complicated	dilemma	into	a	small	space	(using	incompatibility),	Alice	may	end	up	being	
more	confident	than	Bob,	even	though	her	representation	is	less	accurate.	There	is	some	indirect	
support	for	this	idea.	First,	it	appears	that	increasing	information	can	increase	confidence,	without	
increasing	accuracy	(e.g.,	Chervany	and	Dickson,	1974;	Davis	et	al.,	1994;	Paese	and	Sniezek,	1991).	
Second,	the	Dunning-Kruger	effect	is	the	observation	that	low	ability	individuals	can	have	a	harder	
time	recognizing	their	limitations	and	so	are	more	likely	to	feel	overconfident	(Kruger	&	Dunning,	
1999).		
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Figure	SM2.	Alice	employs	a	more	simplified	representation	for	her	problem	and	so	can	devote	more	
time	per	question	than	Bob,	assuming	that	Alice	and	Bob	have	the	same	amount	of	time	for	their	
deliberation.	The	blue	outline	shows	uncertainty	before	deliberation	and	the	red	filler	after	
deliberation.	Alice	may	end	up	resolving	to	a	more	satisfactory	extent	her	fewer	questions	–	and	so	
feel	more	confident	than	Bob	–	but	this	is	largely	because	Bob’s	picture	was	more	nuanced	and	
accurate	to	start	with.		
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Supplementary	Material	4—some	additional	computational	results	
For	Bayesian	Networks,	more	costly	representations	will	involve	a	more	complex	causal	structure,	
when	m=n/3;	this	is	the	version	we	compared	with	full	Bayesian	theory	in	main	text.	We	show	here	
that	even	more	simplification	can	be	achieved	if	the	causal	structure	is	simpler,	with	m=3	(Figure	
SM3a).	For	quantum	theory,	more	costly	representations	will	involve	fewer,	larger	partitions	when	
c=3;	this	is	the	version	we	compared	with	Bayesian	theory	in	main	text.	We	show	here	that	greater	
simplification	can	be	achieved	when	there	are	more	numerous,	simpler	partitions,	with	c=n/3.		
Overall,	Bayesian	Networks	will	afford	more	simplification	when	m=3	than	when	𝑚 = 𝑛/3	
(conditionalizations	are	simpler	in	the	former	case).	Quantum	theory	will	afford	more	simplification	
when	𝑐 = 𝑛/3	than	when	c=3	(there	are	more	partitions	in	the	former	case).	So,	the	versions	of	
Bayesian	Networks	and	quantum	theory	considered	here	are	even	more	advantageous	relative	to	
Bayesian	theory,	compared	to	the	versions	in	main	text.		
	
	
Figure	SM3a.	Bayesian	Networks	(m=n/3)	minus	
Bayesian	Networks	(m=3).	The	graph	shows	that	
the	more	complex	causal	structure	(m=n/3)	is	
most	costly	than	the	simpler	one	(m=3).	
	
Figure	SM3b.	Quantum	theory	(c=3)	minus	
quantum	theory	(c=n/3).	The	graph	shows	that	
fewer,	larger	partitions	(c=3)	are	more	costly	
than	more	numerous	ones	(c=n/3).	
		
	 The	final	issue	is	whether	the	overwhelming	advantage	of	coding	schemes	based	on	
Bayesian	Networks	or	quantum	theory,	over	full	Bayesian	theory,	can	be	reduced,	if	some	sampling	
approach	is	incorporated	in	the	coding	schemes.	We	think	this	is	not	the	case.	We	can	demonstrate	
this	by	offering	variants	of	the	top	two	panels	in	Figure	2	in	main	text,	but	with	an	assumption	that	
only	0.01%	of	the	probability	terms	comprising	the	full	distributions	are	encoded	(we	do	this	
conservatively	and	approximately,	by	reducing	the	probability	terms,	but	not	scaling	down	any	of	the	
other	costs).	Observing	Figures	SM4a	and	SM4b,	it	is	clear	that	an	exponential	increase	in	
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complexity,	with	increasing	questions	and	question	outcomes	still	occurs.	So,	our	essential	point	
(that	Bayesian	Alice	will	be	challenged	by	the	information	cost	of	complex	debates)	remains,	even	if	
there	are	two	mitigating	factors	concerning	the	urgency	of	simplification:	first,	reducing	the	
probability	terms	means	that	there	will	be	many	situations	for	which	full	Bayesian	will	be	as	good	as	
or	even	better	than	an	approach	based	on	Bayesian	Networks	or	quantum	theory.	This	is	evident	in	
the	figures,	because	we	are	plotting	only	data	points	for	which	full	Bayesian	encoding	is	inferior.	
Where	the	figures	show	blank,	full	Bayesian	encoding	is	superior	(e.g.,	when	n=10	and	we	are	
considering	binary	questions).	Second,	the	onset	of	the	exponential	increase	in	complexity	occurs	
later.	So,	Bayesian	Alice	invoking	sampling	approximations	will	be	confounded	by	information	
overload	only	after	more	questions	and	outcomes	per	questions,	compared	to	Bayesian	Alice	
without	sampling	approximations.	Notice	that	in	main	text	Figure	2	the	vertical	axis	for	‘Diff’	(the	
information	cost	advantage)	extends	to	1.5x108,	whereas	presently	this	extends	to	only	about	
40,000,	given	the	same	ranges	for	n,	k.		
Notwithstanding	these	points,	please	also	bear	in	mind	that	we	have	explored	the	impact	
from	a	massive	reduction	in	probability	terms	–	0.01%	reduction	means	that	for	10	binary	questions,	
instead	of	considering	1024	probability	terms	to	represent	her	probability	information,	sampling	
Alice	will	only	consider	less	than	one	term	(let’s	say	one	term).	Clearly,	in	such	cases	we	have	to	
consider	just	how	much	accuracy	Alice	is	willing	to	sacrifice.		
	
Figure	SM4a.	Bayesian	theory	minus	Bayesian	
Networks	(m=n/3),	retaining	only	0.01%	of	
probability	terms.	Points	for	which	Diff<0	are	not	
plotted.		
	
Figure	SM4b.	Bayesian	theory	minus	quantum	
theory	(c=3),	retaining	only	0.01%	of	probability	
terms.	Points	for	which	Diff<0	are	not	plotted.	
	
	
